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This thesis project was commissioned by Data To Information College. This is a technical edu-
cation, training and certification center for both local and international examinations. The 
institution is located in Eldoret, Kenya. The thesis audits the organization in five control do-
mains for compliancy. A Continous Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ) by the Cloud 
Security Alliance is used for the security audit.  
 
In the empirical section, an audit finding was carried out to determine the state of the organ-
ization’s security while accessing and using the cloud. The audit was carried out for the fol-
lowing domains: Audit Assurance & Compliance, Business Continuity Management & Opera-
tional Resilience, Governance and Risk Management, Security Incident Management, Threat 
Vulnerability Management. A business impact analysis (BIA) was carried out on 18 sub-controls 
that were not compliant. Qualitative and semi-quantitative analysis were used to determine 
the level of criticality and risk levels respectively. 
 
A total of 41 questions were asked during the audit and 18 sub-controls were compliant, 18 
were non-compliant and 5 were marked as ‘N/A’ which were either confidential or the audi-
tee didn’t know the answer. Out of the sub-controls that were non-compliant, 11 posed a high 
risk level for the organization, 4  - medium risk level and 3 – low risk level.  
 
In conclusion, the researcher recommended that the organization undertake a threat vulnera-
bility management program to address the non-compliant sub-controls that had a high risk 
level to operational impact of the organization. A list of safeguards to be implemented 
against known threats was also presented. 
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 Keywords  
 
Cloud computing “is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared 
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and 
services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction. This cloud model promotes availability and is composed of five 
essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models” (NIST 2009). 
 
Threat “A potential for violation of security, which exists when there is a circumstance, ca-
pability, action, or event that could breach security and cause harm” (RFC 2828). 
 
Malware “is a software that has some harmful purpose, by itself or as a part of a bigger sys-
tem” (Gregory 2015, 41). 
 
Cloud compliance “is an assurance that the cloud-delivered systems must be following the 
standards that the cloud customers face” (Techopedia 2018). 
 
Security “The condition of a system that results from the establishment and maintenance of 
measures to protect the system” (RFC 2828). 
 
CSA (Cloud Security Alliance) “is the world’s leading organization dedicated to defining and 
raising awareness of best practices to help ensure a secure cloud computing environment.” 
 
 1 Introduction
 
This research-based thesis aims at investigating the threats Data to Information College faces 
in their day-to-day use of cloud services. This is accomplished by carrying out an I.T. audit 
and following the guidelines outlined in the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) Framework to de-
termine the type of threat and risk level. The overall results of the thesis will enable the cli-
ent company to be able to take outlined measures in order to protect their data and privacy 
in the cloud. 
 
The author begins the chapter by introducing the background information for the thesis, aims 
and objectives, research problem, keywords, and case company. 
 
1.1 Background  
 
Cloud computing technology has revolutionized the way data is stored, accessed and trans-
ferred. It is now possible to store and access huge amounts of data off-the-premise without 
the need or worry of physical storage space. In addition to the regular threats to network se-
curity, the unique nature of cloud computing creates a different type of threats that are 
available only in a cloud environment (Alani 2014, 2).  
 
In their The Treacherous Twelve, Cloud Security Alliance have identified twelve threats that 
represent most important threats to cloud computing in the year 2016. “The threats identi-
fied serves as an up-to-date guide that will help cloud users and providers make informed de-
cisions about risk mitigation within a cloud strategy” (Cloud Security Alliance 2016). 
 
The case company for this thesis, Data To Information College, is a certification center that 
handles confidential students’ data which is vital for protection and privacy since they store 
their data in the cloud. Security breaches could jeopardize the running of the organization 
and confidence from the students. “The CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) triad 
of information security is an information security benchmark model used to evaluate the in-
formation security of an organization. The CIA triad of information security implements secu-
rity using three key areas related to information systems including confidentiality, integrity 
and availability” (Techopedia 2018). 
 
Data To Information College started using cloud computing technology in the year 2016. This 
has greatly benefitted the company in-terms of cost-saving and resource personnel, however 
it is facing information security challenges while using the technology. This created a need 
for research to be conducted in to find out loopholes in the organization’s information securi-
ty structure. 
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1.2 Thesis objective 
 
The thesis aims at analyzing the current situation in the organization by carrying out an IT 
audit and then proposing a list of controls to be implemented based on the CSA framework. 
 
The objectives of this project are: 
 Determine the current state of cloud security by carrying out an audit based on Con-
sensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire. 
 Document the current state of the cloud computing service model 
 Perform a business impact analysis (BIA) to determine risk level and recovery plan 
 Publish a list of controls to be implemented based on Cloud Security Alliance security 
guidance. 
 
1.3 Case company 
 
The case company for the thesis is Data To Information College. It is a privately owned insti-
tution that was started in the year 2002 as a technical education, Training and Testing Center 
for both local and foreign exams (d2ikenya 2014). 
 
The college is only one of the three certified test centers for Test Of English as a Foreign Lan-
guage (TOEFL) in the country, with the rest two located in the capital city of Kenya. It is affil-
iated with several major companies in the I.T industry such as Microsoft, Pearson VUE, Comp-
TIA, SAT, IELTS and CISCO By the end of year 2017, the college had 20 staffs and average of 
150 students (d2ikenya 2014). 
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2 Threat Mitigation in Cloud Computing 
 
This chapter studies various theories from books, journals and internet sources regarding 
cloud computing. The outcome will be secondary data in regard to the thesis outcome. This 
chapter aims to illustrate the inception of cloud computing and threats faced. 
 
2.1 Defining cloud computing 
 
Many cloud experts and vendors have tried to define what cloud computing is. According to 
(Chandrasekaran 2015, 12) “cloud computing is a means of storing and accessing data and 
programs over the Internet from a remote location or computer instead of our computer’s 
hard drive. This is one of the simplest terms and it is only provides a representative of the 
whole definition.” 
 
NIST 800-145 puts forth a formal definition of cloud computing as a “model for enabling ubiq-
uitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing 
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction” 
(Mell & Grance 2011). 
 
The definition from NIST gets a backing from International Standards Organization (ISO), 
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). 
This is why it is more agreed by vendors, experts and pundits. 
 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) went further ahead by putting forth a 5-
4-3 principle that describes “(a) the five essential characteristic features that promote cloud 
computing, (b) the four deployment models that are used to narrate the cloud computing op-
portunities for customers while looking at architectural models, and (c) the three important 
and basic service offering models of cloud computing” (Chandrasekaran 2015, 14.) 
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Cloud computing model has been visualized by Mogull, Arlen, Gilbert, Lane, Mortman, Peter-
son and Rothman (2017, 11) in their book security guidance as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Visualization of cloud computing (Mogull et al. 2017, 10) 
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2.1.1 Essential characteristics  
 
There are five essential characteristics that define a cloud as implied by NIST. 
 
The table below summarizes these characteristics.  
Element NIST description 
Resource 
pooling 
It is the most fundamental characteristic. The provider abstracts resources and 
collects them into a pool, portions of which can be allocated to diﬀerent con-
sumers (typically based on policies). 
On-demand 
self-service 
A consumer can unilaterally provision computing capabilities, such as server 
time and network storage, as needed automatically without requiring human 
interaction with each service’s provider. 
Broad net-
work access 
It means that all resources are available over a network, without any need for 
direct physical access; the network is not necessarily part of the service. 
Rapid elas-
ticity 
This allows consumers to expand or contract the resources they use from the 
pool (provisioning and deprovisioning), often completely automatically. It also 
allows them to more closely match resource consumption with demand (for 
example, adding virtual servers as demand increases, then shutting them down 
when demand drops).  
Measured 
service 
Cloud systems automatically control and optimize resource use by leveraging a 
metering capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the type of ser-
vice (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and active user accounts). Resource 
usage can be monitored, controlled, and reported providing transparency for 
both the provider and consumer of the utilized service. 
Table 1: Essential characteristics of cloud computing (Mogull et al. 2017, 10) 
 
These essential characteristics means that cloud computing enables businesses and companies 
to be able to operate freely and cheaply without the need for large personnel teams, expen-
sive hardware, software and networking resources. 
 
2.1.2 Service models 
 
Cloud service offering models are divided into three classes, namely: (1) Software as a Ser-
vice, (2) Platform as a Service, and (3) Infrastructure as a Service. Additionally, there is also 
the hardware layer and abstraction layer of software. The hardware layer contains proces-
sors, memory and storage components while the abstraction layer of software which lies be-
low Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) acts as a hypervisor by realizing the unique characteris-
tics of cloud computing. 
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In his book on securing the cloud, Alani (2014, 2) outlines the various layers of cloud compu-
ting as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Layers of cloud computing (Alani 2014, 2) 
 
Software as a Service (SaaS):  
 
This is a full application that resides on top of the cloud stack. It’s managed and hosted by 
the provider and the applications can be accessed via thin client interfaces such as a web 
browser or a program interface. 
 
 
 
Platform as a Service (Paas):  
 
“This layer gives the capability to deploy consumer-created or acquired applications using 
programming languages and tools supported by the provider” (Marinescu 2013, 32). 
 
According to Mogull et al. (2017, 11) Application Programming Interfaces (API) access to fea-
tures of a full SaaS application. The key diﬀerentiator is that, with PaaS, you don’t manage 
the underlying servers, networks, or other infrastructure.  
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The figure below shows Paas running on top of IaaS architecture according to Cloud Security 
Alliance. 
 
 
Figure 3: PaaS running on top of IaaS architecture (Mogull et al. 2017, 17) 
 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): 
 
This is the lowest service level provided to the client. IaaS provides the cloud computing cli-
ent with controlled access to the virtual infrastructure whereby the client can install operat-
ing system and application software. In this model, the client manages the security aspects 
from the operating system up to the application software but doesn’t control the physical 
hardware. 
Iaas offers a huge responsibility in terms of security and thus is not popular among clients. In 
Iaas, the clients runs most of the management duties while in Paas the vendor manages eve-
rything. 
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Figure 4 below shows Iaas architecture. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Compute IaaS platform architecture (Mogull et al. 2017, 11) 
 
 
2.1.3 Deployment models 
 
According to Mogull et al. (2017, 11), both NIST and ISO/IEC use four cloud deployment mod-
els.  
 
Public cloud: 
 
The cloud infrastructure is made available to the general public or a large industry group and 
is owned by an organization selling cloud services. 
 
Private cloud: 
 
The cloud infrastructure is operated solely for a single organization. It may be managed by 
the organization or by a third party and may be located on-premises or oﬀ-premises. 
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Community cloud: 
 
The cloud infrastructure is shared by several organizations and supports a specific community 
that has shared concerns. It may be managed by the organizations or by a third party and may 
be located on-premises or oﬀ-premises. 
 
Hybrid cloud: 
 
The cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more clouds (private, community, or pub-
lic) that remain unique entities but are bound together by standardized or proprietary tech-
nology that enables data and application portability.   
 
2.2 Cloud ecosystem 
 
According to Chandrasekaran (2015, 41) cloud ecosystem is a term used to describe the com-
plete environment or system of interdependent components or entities that work together to 
enable and support the cloud services. This ecosystem contains complex entities that inter-
acts with other components and organization with individuals (actors) who are responsible for 
providing and consuming cloud services. 
 
There are three actors in a cloud ecosystem: 
a) Cloud Service Users (CSU), 
b) Cloud Service Providers (CSP), 
c) Cloud Service Partners (CSN). 
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Figure 5 illustrates how the three actors are involved in a cloud ecosystem. 
 
 
Figure 5: The three actors of a cloud ecosystem (ITU 2012, 13) 
 
 
Cloud Service Users (CSU) 
 
This is a consumer, organization or enterprise that makes use of the delivered cloud services. 
An intermediate user that delivers the cloud services to the end user can also be a CSU. These 
end users may include applications, persons or machines (Chandrasekaran 2015, 42). 
 
Cloud Service Providers (CSP) 
 
“An organization that provides or delivers and maintains or manages cloud services, that is, 
provider of SaaS, PaaS, IaaS, or any allied computing infrastructure” (Chandrasekaran 2015, 
42). 
 
Cloud Service Partners (CSN) 
 
“A person or organization (e.g., application developer; content, software, hardware, and/or 
equipment provider; system integrator; and/or auditor) that provides support to the building 
of a service offered by a CSP (e.g., service integration)” (Chandrasekaran 2015, 42). 
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The figure below shows how actors interact in a cloud ecosystem. 
 
 
Figure 6: Actors with some of their possible roles in a cloud ecosystem (ITU 2012, 13) 
 
From the concepts illustrated in subchapters 2.1.3 and 2.2, cloud service models require cer-
tain features to be exhibited in order to be considered as services. The following are basic 
requirements for a service as outlined by Chandrasekaran (2015, 43-44): 
 
a) Multitenancy: Multitenancy is an essential characteristic of cloud systems aiming to 
provide isolation of the different users of the cloud system (tenants) while maximiz-
ing resource sharing. It is expected that multitenancy be supported at various levels 
of a cloud infrastructure. 
b) Service life cycle management: Cloud services are paid as per usage and can be start-
ed and ended at any time. Therefore, it is required that a cloud service support au-
tomatic service provisioning. In addition, metering and charging or billing settlement 
needs to be provided for services that are dynamically created, modified, and then 
released in virtual environments. 
c) Security: The security of each individual service needs to be protected in the mul-
titenant cloud environment; the users (tenants) also support the needed secured ser-
vices, meaning that a cloud provides strict control for tenants’ service access to dif-
ferent resources to avoid the abuse of cloud resources and to facilitate the manage-
ment of CSUs by CSPs. 
d) Responsiveness: The cloud ecosystem is expected to enable early detection, diagno-
sis, and fixing of service-related problems in order to help the customers use the ser-
vices faithfully. 
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e) Intelligent service deployment: It is expected that the cloud enables efficient use of 
resources in service deployment, that is, maximizing the number of deployed services 
while minimizing the usage of resources and still respecting the SLAs.  
f) Portability: It is expected that a cloud service supports the portability of its features 
over various underlying resources and that CSPs should be able to accommodate cloud 
workload portability (e.g., VM portability) with limited service disruption. 
g) Interoperability: It is expected to have available well-documented and well-tested 
specifications that allow heterogeneous systems in cloud environments to work to-
gether. 
h) Regulatory aspects: All applicable regulations shall be respected, including privacy 
protection. 
i) Environmental sustainability: A key characteristic of cloud computing is the capability 
to access, through a broad network and thin clients, on-demand shared pools of con-
figurable resources that can be rapidly provisioned and released. Virtualization and 
multitenancy technologies enables this to be achieved.  
j) Service reliability, service availability, and quality assurance: CSUs demand for their 
services end-to-end quality of service (QoS) assurance, high levels of reliability, and 
continued availability to their CSPs. 
k) Service access: A cloud infrastructure is expected to provide CSUs with access to 
cloud services from any user device. It is expected that CSUs have a consistent expe-
rience when accessing cloud services. 
l) Flexibility: It is expected that the cloud service be capable of supporting multiple 
cloud deployment models and cloud service categories. 
m) Accounting and charging: It is expected that a cloud service be capable to support 
various accounting and charging models and policies. 
n) Massive data processing: It is expected that a cloud supports mechanisms for massive 
data processing. 
 
2.3 Cloud security 
 
Current-state architecture, engineering and operational practices in the cyber security do-
main focus largely on compliance to one or many regulations, directives, policies or frame-
works. Security responsibilities is a major issue in cloud computing and thus is shared across 
the stack (Muckin & Fitch, 2015). 
 
Data sharing in the cloud is a big risk itself. Marinescu argues that “the economical, social, 
ethical, and legal implications of this shift in technology, in which users rely on services pro-
vided by large data centers and store private data and software on systems they do not con-
trol, are likely to be significant” (2013, 1). 
 18 
The client company uses private PaaS on a public cloud, and thus the cloud provider is re-
sponsible for security of the platform, while the consumer is responsible for everything they 
implement including configurations of security devices that have been offered.  
 
Figure 7 below shows the security responsibilities while using cloud services. 
 
 
Figure 7: Security responsibility in cloud services (Mogull et al. 2017, 21) 
 
It can thus be deducted that the consumer has more security responsibilities when using IaaS 
while the opposite is true while using SaaS. Platform as a Service (PaaS) offers shared respon-
sibilities between the consumer and service provider. 
 
As outlined by the Cloud Security Alliance, “the most important security consideration is 
knowing exactly who is responsible for what in any given cloud project” (Mogull et al. 2017, 
21). 
 
2.3.1 Threats 
 
“Threats, defined as people or events, are what causes damages to assets and systems in an 
organization. Therefore, threats must be the primary driver of a well-designed and properly 
defended application, system, mission, environment or enterprise” (Muckin & Fitch 2015, 3). 
 
A white paper by Lockheed Martin Corporation in 2015 titled ‘A Threat-Driven Approach To 
CyberSecurity’ provides detailed guidance that will enable organizations to place threats at 
the forefront of planning, design, testing, deployment and operational activities. This is due 
to the fact that most resources are wasted on controls that do not address actual threats, 
moreover, these controls effectiveness are evaluated in binary conditions. A gap is then cre-
ated since there isn’t a formal threat modelling and no strict adherence to compliance re-
quirements. 
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 Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) released a list of twelve main threats in cloud computing in the 
year 2016. The list was named ‘The Treacherous 12 - Cloud Computing Top Threats in 2016’ 
and ranked these threats in the order of severity per survey results.  
 
The threats are:  
i. Data Breaches 
ii. Weak Identity, Credential and Access Management 
iii. Insecure APIs 
iv. System and Application Vulnerabilities 
v. Account Hijacking 
vi. Malicious Insiders 
vii. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) 
viii. Data Loss 
ix. Insufficient Due Diligence 
x. Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Services 
xi. Denial of Service 
xii. Shared Technology Issues 
 
Controls for the respective threats have been attached in Appendix 2. According to Cloud Se-
curity Alliance, the report that was presented serves as an up-to-date guide that will help 
cloud users and providers make informed decisions about risk mitigation within a cloud strat-
egy. 
 
2.3.2 Mitigations and controls 
 
In order to identify threats and suggest controls to be put in place, threat analysis is usually 
conducted with two main aims:  
a) To provide a clear and thorough articulation of assets, threats and attacks to facili-
tate relevant decision-making actions regarding risk level determination and risk 
management practices. 
b) To select, implement, evaluate and determine gaps in security controls at the appli-
cation, system, infrastructure and enterprise levels. 
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3 Research Methodology 
 
Auditing is an important process that helps in threat mitigation in cloud computing by evalu-
ating the efficiency of the controls put in place and adherence to applicable standards. It as-
sists in monitoring internal process of the organization, procedures and usage of tools. 
 
Gantz (2013) states that “IT auditing helps organizations understand, assess, and improve 
their use of controls to safeguard IT, measure and correct performance, and achieve objec-
tives and intended outcomes. IT audits tend to be less subjective and more reliable compared 
to quantitative or qualitative analysis since their determinations are more binary.” This 
means that the controls can either be conforming or nonconforming to the criteria.  
 
There are several reasons as to why an IT audit is justified and useful for an organization. The 
main reasons as justified by (Gantz 2013) are; 
 
a. evaluating the effectiveness of implemented controls; 
b. confirming adherence to internal policies, processes, and procedures; 
c. checking conformity to IT governance or control frameworks and standards; 
d. analyzing vulnerabilities and configuration settings to support continuous monitoring;  
e. identifying weaknesses and deficiencies as part of initial or ongoing risk management;  
f. measuring performance against quality benchmarks or service level agreements; and 
g. self-assessing the organization against standards or criteria that will be used in antic-
ipated external audits. 
 
An I.T. audit was carried out to determine the scope of security measures in place, purpose of 
the various security controls and gaps in the implementation. Consensus Assessments Initia-
tive Questionnaire (CAIQ) v3.0.1 by the Cloud Security Alliance was used for the audit pro-
cess. The questions were tailored to suit the client company and it was based on the follow-
ing elements: 
 
a) Assessing the security controls. 
b) Identifying control gaps. 
c) Suggest and implement controls to fill the gaps based on the framework. 
d) Managing changes over time. 
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A section of the Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire used for the audit study is 
shown in Figure 8 below. 
 
 
Figure 8: A section of the audit questions on CAIQ. (CAI 2016e) 
 
Assess security controls 
 
In many IT audits, assessment of security controls is vital since information and assets need to 
be protected from harm due to loss of CIA. The CAIQ questions required binary answers 
(yes/no) or not applicable (N/A); in the case where a question does not relate to the client or 
the client doesn’t know whether the criteria is fulfilled.  
 
Identify control gaps 
 
This is done by analyzing the answers in the Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire 
(CAIQ). The audit results is checked against the recommended control framework legislations 
by Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) and the gaps are therefore identified. 
 
Suggest and implement controls 
 
Controls that have not been implemented or partially implemented are then suggested to be 
replaced by controls proposed in the CSA framework. 
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Managing changes over time 
 
It is important for the controls to be reviewed and new security measures implement-
ed/updated regularly due to the evolving nature of cloud-based threats and technology in the 
computing world. 
 
Five control domains were tested for compliance in the audit. These areas are: 
 
a) Audit Assurance & Compliance 
This was to test whether the organization was compliant with the regulations for 
cloud deployments. Compliance validates awareness of and adherence to corporate 
obligations such as policies, contracts and applicable laws whereas audits are a key 
tool for proving/disproving compliance. 
 
b) Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience 
The main aspect of this section was to check whether there is continuity and recovery 
plan in case of a disaster. 
 
c) Governance and Risk Management 
Governance checks the policy, process, and internal controls that comprise how an 
organization is run. Contracts, cloud provider assessments and compliance reporting 
are the key tools for governance. Risk management covers either risk to information 
or the organization as a whole. 
 
d) Security Incident Management, E-Discovery & Cloud Forensics 
This domain checks whether there are policies and procedures established to check 
whether there is contractual obligations for employees to report information security 
events in a timely manner. 
 
e) Threat and Vulnerability Management 
This is a cycle that involves threat identity, assessment, classification, remediation, 
and mitigation of security weaknesses while understanding the root cause analysis. 
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3.1 Data collection and analysis 
 
Questionnaire and in-depth interview were the main data collection methods for the audit. 
An in-depth interview was conducted with the head of IT and the organization’s principle, 
who is also the owner. During this interview questions from the CAIQ were asked and the re-
sults recorded. Data concerning the provider was also recorded and if the client didn’t have 
an answer or was confidential was marked as ‘N/A’, otherwise the result was ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. 
 
A business impact analysis (BIA) predicts the consequences of disruption of a business function 
and process and gathers information needed to develop recovery strategies. Analysis of the 
recorded data was done by performing a business impact analysis (BIA). This is because a BIA 
enables the management to make important decisions during disaster recovery planning. Crit-
ical assets and areas that need immediate attention can be attended to in a timely manner, 
thereby saving the company in terms of finances and resources. 
 
A qualitative risk analysis was further employed and values low, medium and high were used 
to evaluate the operational impact. However, the only drawback with this type of assessment 
was that since the scale level wasn’t refined, the difference between levels aren’t clearly 
seen. 
 
 
Figure 9: Qualitative analysis method (Hotchkiss 2010) 
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4 Audited Environment 
 
The client company uses private PaaS (Platform as a Service) which is highlighted in yellow in 
Figure 10 below. In a PaaS architecture, the vendor manages infrastructure and the applica-
tion stack while the client deploys onto the cloud infrastructure acquired applications and 
configures the user details such as logins. PaaS services are available from the internet and 
thus the consumer doesn’t manage the underlying cloud infrastructure. 
 
As demonstrated by Kavis (2014, 38) Figure 11 shows what cloud stacks the client manages in 
a PaaS architecture. 
 
Figure 10: PaaS architecture on a cloud stack (Kavis 2014, 38) 
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The diagram below shows  the platform that the client organization uses on a public cloud 
and its various essential characteristics.  
 
Figure 11: Client organization using PaaS on a public cloud 
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5 Audit Results  
 
The Consensus Assessments Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ) was filled out during the audit 
process and the detailed results are attached in Appendix 1. The results from the question-
naire was summarized as below with the respective numbers of passed, failed and N/A in dif-
ferent domains. 
 
  CAIQ Results  
Domain Yes No N/A 
Audit Assurance & 
Compliance 
2 5 0 
Business Continuity 
Management & Oper-
ational Resilience 
2 0 0 
Governance and Risk 
Management 
6 8 3 
Security Incident 
Management, E-
Discovery & Cloud 
Forensics 
4 1 2 
Threat and Vulnera-
bility Management 
4 4 0 
Total 18 18 5 
Table 2: Summarized results in table form 
 
A total of 41 questions were assessed and the pass rate was a total of 18 sub-controls, failed 
18 and the answers for 5 sub-controls were either confidential or not available. 
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Pie chart visualization of the passed, failed and “N/A” controls. 
 
Figure 12: Pie chart of passed vs failed controls in percentage form 
 
Based on the results of the audit, 44% of the sub controls are non-compliant with the standard 
framework while 44% are compliant.  
 
The audited assets that had been marked as “No” on the CAIQ were then classified as critical 
or non-critical with operational impacts noted.  
 
For operational impacts, the values were: 
 Low: Operational impact is low and the business will run but may need extra re-
sources. 
 Medium: Business impact is significant and operations may be difficult to go on even 
with extra resources.  
 High: High operational impact on the business which will cause financial losses and 
dissatisfaction within clients. Recovery may be uncertain. 
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Table 3 below shows the qualitative analysis of operational impact on various controls that 
were not in compliant with the industry standards. 
 
Control Domain Consensus Assessment  
Question not passed 
Critical Non-
Critical 
Operational 
Impact 
Risk     
Level 
Audit Assurance 
& Compliance 
Production of audit asser-
tions using a structured 
format 
 X Low 5 
Conducting network pene-
tration tests 
X  High 100 
Conducting application pen-
etration tests 
X  High 100 
Conducting external audits  X Low 5 
Internal audit program that 
allows for cross-functional 
audit of assessments 
 X Medium 25 
Governance and 
Risk Manage-
ment 
Capability to continuously 
monitor and report the 
compliance of your infra-
structure against your in-
formation security baselines 
 X Medium 25 
Do you allow your clients to 
provide their own trusted 
virtual machine image to 
ensure conformance to their 
own internal standards? 
 X Low 5 
Do you provide security con-
trol health data in order to 
allow tenants to implement 
industry standard Continu-
ous Monitoring (which al-
lows continual tenant vali-
dation of your physical and 
logical control status)? 
 X Medium 25 
Do you ensure your provid-
ers adhere to your infor-
mation security and privacy 
policies 
X  High 100 
Do you have agreements to X  High 100 
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ensure your providers ad-
here to your information 
security and privacy poli-
cies? 
Is the likelihood and impact 
associated with inherent 
and residual risk determined 
independently, considering 
all risk categories (e.g., au-
dit results, threat and vul-
nerability analysis, and reg-
ulatory compliance)? 
X  High 100 
Documented, organization-
wide program in place to 
manage risk 
 X High 100 
Do you make available doc-
umentation of your organi-
zation-wide risk manage-
ment program? 
 X Medium 25 
Security Inci-
dent Manage-
ment, E-
Discovery & 
Cloud Forensics 
Have you tested your securi-
ty incident response plans in 
the last year? 
X  High 100 
Threat and Vul-
nerability Man-
agement 
Update of security threats 
detection system 
X  High 100 
Conducting network-layer 
vulnerability scans regularly 
X  High 100 
Conducting application-
layer vulnerability scans 
regularly 
X  High 100 
Capability to rapidly patch 
vulnerabilities across all 
computing devices, applica-
tions, and systems 
X  High 100 
Table 3: Business impact analysis of the non-compliant standards 
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A semi-quantitative risk assessment method was used to calculate risk level. This type of as-
sessment employs the advantages of both qualitative and quantitative analysis where qualita-
tive analysis would be too general in classification during I.T. audits and quantitative analysis 
would be too extreme. “Semi-quantitative risk assessment is generally used where one is at-
tempting to optimize the allocation of available resources to minimize the impact of a group 
of risks under the control of one  organization” (Semi-quantitative risk characterization n.d.). 
 
The operational impact was divided into 3 categories; Low, Medium and High. The categories 
were then assigned values (10 – low, 50 – 100 medium - high). In Table 4 below, the criticality 
level was then assigned values (1.0 - critical) and (0.5 – non-critical). The risk level was calcu-
lated by multiplying the criticality level by operational impact. 
 
Risk level = Criticality level X Operational impact 
 
 Operational impact 
Criticality level Low (10) Medium (50) High (100) 
Critical (1.0) (1.0x10=10)  
Low 
(1.0x50=50)  
Medium 
(1.0x100=100) 
High 
Non-Critical (0.5) (0.5x10=5) 
Low 
(0.5x50=25) 
Medium 
(0.5x100=50) 
Medium 
Table 4: Risk level matrix 
 
The scale for the risk level was 0-10 low, 11-50 medium and 51-100 High. 
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Based on the results of the semi-quantitative analysis of the operational impact, the number 
of sub-controls in various risk levels is summarized below. 
                                       
  (Low Risk)  (Medium 
Risk) 
(High Risk) 
Control Domains Number of sub-controls in their respective 
risk categories 
Audit Assurance & Compli-
ance 
2 1 2 
Governance and Risk Man-
agement 
1 3 4 
Security Incident Manage-
ment, E-Discovery & Cloud 
Forensics 
0 0 1 
Threat and Vulnerability 
Management 
0 0 4 
Total number of sub-
controls in the risk level 
3 4 11 
Table 5: Analysis of the risk level 
 
From the results presented above in the analysis risk level, eleven sub-controls pose the high-
est risk level for the organization which is 100. This means that in the event of a disaster, the 
recovery of the organization may be uncertain and it will incur financial losses. 
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6 Recommendations 
 
High risk operational impact:  
Based on the results of the risk analysis level, the organization should implement a vulnerabil-
ity management program to fix the non-compliant controls in Threat and Vulnerability Man-
agement domain. This is because most of the sub-controls that have a high risk level fall un-
der this domain. In the event of a disaster, the inability of the controls to conform to the laid 
out industry standards will  results in uncertain recovery of the organization. The primary ob-
jectives of vulnerability management according to Kandek (2015, 10) are to: 
 Maintain a database of the computers and devices of your network – your hardware 
assets. 
 Compile a list of installed software – your software assets. 
 Change a software configuration to make it less susceptible to attack. 
 Identify and fix faults in the installed software that affect security. 
 Alert to additions of new devices, ports or software to the databases to allow an 
analysis of the changed attack surface and to detect successful attacks. 
 Indicate the most effective workflow for patching and updating your devices to 
thwart attacks (such as malware, bots and so on). 
 Enable the effective management of security risks. 
 Document the state of security for audit and compliance with laws, regulations and 
business policy. 
 Continually repeat the preceding steps so as to ensure the ongoing protection of your 
network security. 
 
 There are seven objectives that the organization should fulfil for a successful vulnerability 
management program: 
 
a) Discovering and categorization of assets. 
The organization should update its current asset inventory and categorize them in 
groups.  
b) Prioritizing assets based on risk level. 
Categorizing assets based on risk level helps in vulnerability scan customizations and 
assists in assigning risk rankings. 
c) Vulnerability scanning. 
Perform the scan to test and analyze systems and services for known vulnerabilities. 
d) Prioritizing vulnerabilities. 
After the scan, a report is generated that contains the prioritized list of vulnerabili-
ties, vulnerability description, calculated risk, and remediation activities. 
 
 33 
e) Generate attack paths to high risk assets. 
Attack paths helps understand where the critical assets are and how the topography 
around the assets look like. This assists in defining what points should be locked down 
in case of a severe threat. 
f) Remediation, patching and monitoring. 
Remediation should be prioritized on a risk basis and should be done by the following 
methods: 
 Installation of a software patch 
 Adjustment of a configuration setting 
 Removal of affected software 
 Implementation of compensation control 
Patches must then be applied and monitored. 
g) Validation of reports to ensure the vulnerabilities have been addressed. 
Rescanning should be done to confirm that the vulnerabilities have been addressed 
and reports produced to identify compliance in the ongoing security activities. 
 
Medium risk operational impact: 
Non-compliant controls that fall under Business Continuity Management and Governance pose 
medium risk operational impact on the organization. The organizations should change man-
agement policies to monitor changes in the organization’s use of the cloud services. This 
should enable them to track any changes or abnormalities in their services. They should also 
aim to pursue a negotiated Service Level Agreement (SLA) with the cloud provider when the 
current one expires. This is because a negotiated SLA will enable the organization to address 
its security and privacy policies, compliance with laws and regulations, segregation and data 
encryption, breach notification and data ownership. 
 
Low risk operational impact: 
The management should undertake compliance, audits and assurance continuously to effec-
tively manage controls that had a low risk business impact. 
 
Detailed recommendations that should be applied as highlighted by the Cloud Security Alli-
ance (CSA) in their ‘Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing’ docu-
ment have been attached in Appendix 3. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
The aim of the study was to carry out a security audit on a certification and training center 
for both local and international exams that uses a Platform as a Service model. Sub-controls 
under 5 domains were audited for compliance. The pass rate was 44%, fail was 44% and 12% 
was ‘N/A’ which means the answers were confidential or the auditee didn’t know the answer.  
These results reflect the state of the company’s IT security and systems at the time of the 
audit. A total of 41 questions were asked during the audit and 18 resulted in ‘Yes’ which 
means that they were compliant, 18 were marked as ‘No’ and 5 questions as ‘N/A’. A business 
impact analysis was carried out on 18 controls which were failed and a qualitative analysis 
methodology was used to determine the level of criticality for each sub-control. A semi-
quantitative analysis was then used to calculate the risk level, and this resulted 11 controls 
having a high risk level, 4 medium risk and 3 low risk. 
 
A threat vulnerability management program was proposed for the high risk controls, change of 
policies in the organization for the medium risk controls and undertaking of compliance and 
audits continuously to manage low risk controls.  
 
 Decreasing expense and expanding productivity are the attracting factors for the migration 
towards a public cloud, yet giving up duty regarding security ought not to be. Ultimately, the 
organization is responsible for the decision of public cloud and the security and protection of 
the outsourced services. Observing and tending to security issues that emerge stay in the do-
main of the organization, as does oversight over other essential issues such as execution and 
information protection. Due to the security challenges brought about by cloud computing, it 
is important for an organization to oversee and manage how the cloud provider secures and 
maintains the computing environment and ensures data is kept secure. 
 
Due to the evolving nature of the cloud computing world, it is important for the organization 
to carry out security audits regularly so that they could be compliant and be able to manage 
future threats effectively. 
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Appendix 1: CAIQ results 
 
Control Domain Control 
ID 
Question 
ID 
Control Specification Consensus Assessment Questions Yes No N/A 
Audit Assurance 
& Compliance 
Audit Planning 
  
AAC-01 AAC-01.1 Audit plans shall be developed and 
maintained to address business 
process disruptions. Auditing plans 
shall focus on reviewing the effec-
tiveness of the implementation of 
security operations. All audit activ-
ities must be agreed upon prior to 
executing any audits. 
Do you produce audit assertions 
using a structured, industry ac-
cepted format (e.g., CloudAu-
dit/A6 URI Ontology, CloudTrust, 
SCAP/CYBEX, GRC XML, ISACA's 
Cloud Computing Management Au-
dit/Assurance Program, etc.)? 
  No   
AAC-02 AAC-02.2   Do you conduct network penetra-
tion tests of your cloud service 
infrastructure regularly as pre-
scribed by industry best practices 
and guidance? 
  No   
AAC-02.3 Do you conduct application pene-
tration tests of your cloud infra-
structure regularly as prescribed 
by industry best practices and 
guidance? 
  No   
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AAC-02.4 Do you conduct internal audits 
regularly as prescribed by industry 
best practices and guidance? 
Yes     
AAC-02.5 Do you conduct external audits 
regularly as prescribed by industry 
best practices and guidance? 
  No   
AAC-02.8 Do you have an internal audit pro-
gram that allows for cross-
functional audit of assessments? 
  No   
Business Conti-
nuity Manage-
ment & Opera-
tional Resilience 
Business Conti-
nuity Testing 
BCR-02 BCR-02.1 Business continuity and security 
incident response plans shall be 
subject to testing at planned inter-
vals or upon significant organiza-
tional or environmental changes. 
Incident response plans shall in-
volve impacted customers (tenant) 
and other business relationships 
that represent critical intra-supply 
chain business process dependen-
cies. 
Are business continuity plans sub-
ject to testing at planned intervals 
or upon significant organizational 
or environmental changes to en-
sure continuing effectiveness? 
Yes     
BCR-10 BCR-10.1 Policies and procedures shall be 
established, and supporting busi-
ness processes and technical 
measures implemented, for appro-
Are policies and procedures estab-
lished and made available for all 
personnel to adequately support 
services operations’ roles? 
Yes   
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priate IT governance and service 
management to ensure appropriate 
planning, delivery and support of 
the organization's IT capabilities 
supporting business functions, 
workforce, and/or customers based 
on industry acceptable standards 
(i.e., ITIL v4 and COBIT 5). Addi-
tionally, policies and procedures 
shall include defined roles and re-
sponsibilities supported by regular 
workforce training. 
 Governance 
and Risk Man-
agement 
Risk Assessments 
GRM-02 GRM-01.2  Baseline security requirements 
shall be established for developed 
or acquired, organizationally-
owned or managed, physical or 
virtual, applications and infrastruc-
ture system, and network compo-
nents that comply with applicable 
legal, statutory, and regulatory 
compliance obligations. Deviations 
from standard baseline configura-
tions must be authorized following 
change management policies and 
Do you have the capability to con-
tinuously monitor and report the 
compliance of your infrastructure 
against your information security 
baselines? 
  No   
GRM-01.3 Do you allow your clients to pro-
vide their own trusted virtual ma-
chine image to ensure conform-
ance to their own internal stand-
ards? 
  No   
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procedures prior to deployment, 
provisioning, or use. Compliance 
with security baseline require-
ments must be reassessed at least 
annually unless an alternate fre-
quency has been established and 
authorized based on business 
needs. 
 GRM-02 GRM-02.1 Risk assessments associated with 
data governance requirements 
shall be conducted at planned in-
tervals and shall consider the fol-
lowing: 
 • Awareness of where sensitive 
data is stored and transmitted 
across applications, databases, 
servers, and network infrastructure 
 • Compliance with defined reten-
tion periods and end-of-life dispos-
al requirements 
 • Data classification and protec-
tion from unauthorized use, ac-
cess, loss, destruction, and falsifi-
cation 
Do you provide security control 
health data in order to allow ten-
ants to implement industry stand-
ard Continuous Monitoring (which 
allows continual tenant validation 
of your physical and logical control 
status)? 
  No   
GRM-02.2 Do you conduct risk assessments 
associated with data governance 
requirements at least once a year? 
Yes    
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Governance and 
Risk Manage-
ment 
Management 
Program 
GRM-04 GRM-04.1 An Information Security Manage-
ment Program (ISMP) shall be de-
veloped, documented, approved, 
and implemented that includes 
administrative, technical, and 
physical safeguards to protect as-
sets and data from loss, misuse, 
unauthorized access, disclosure, 
alteration, and destruction. The 
security program shall include, but 
not be limited to, the following 
areas insofar as they relate to the 
characteristics of the business: 
 • Risk management 
 • Security policy 
 • Organization of information se-
curity 
 • Asset management 
 • Human resources security 
 • Physical and environmental se-
curity 
 • Communications and operations 
management 
 • Access control 
Do you provide tenants with docu-
mentation describing your Infor-
mation Security Management Pro-
gram (ISMP)? 
    N/A 
GRM-04.2 Do you review your Information 
Security Management Program 
(ISMP) at least once a year? 
Yes     
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 • Information systems acquisition, 
development, and maintenance 
Governance and 
Risk Manage-
ment 
Management 
Support / In-
volvement 
GRM-05 GRM-05.1 Executive and line management 
shall take formal action to support 
information security through clear-
ly-documented direction and com-
mitment, and shall ensure the ac-
tion has been assigned. 
Do you ensure your providers ad-
here to your information security 
and privacy policies? 
  No   
Governance and 
Risk Manage-
ment 
Policy 
GRM-06 GRM-06.1 Information security policies and 
procedures shall be established and 
made readily available for review 
by all impacted personnel and ex-
ternal business relationships. In-
formation security policies must be 
Do your information security and 
privacy policies align with industry 
standards (ISO-27001, ISO-22307, 
CoBIT, etc.)? 
Yes     
GRM-06.2 Do you have agreements to ensure 
your providers adhere to your in-
  No   
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authorized by the organization's 
business leadership (or other ac-
countable business role or func-
tion) and supported by a strategic 
business plan and an information 
security management program in-
clusive of defined information se-
curity roles and responsibilities for 
business leadership. 
formation security and privacy pol-
icies? 
GRM-06.3 Can you provide evidence of due 
diligence mapping of your controls, 
architecture, and processes to reg-
ulations and/or standards? 
    N/A 
GRM-06.4 Do you disclose which controls, 
standards, certifications, and/or 
regulations you comply with? 
    N/A 
Governance and 
Risk Manage-
ment 
Business / Policy 
Change Impacts 
GRM-08 GRM-08.1 Risk assessment results shall in-
clude updates to security policies, 
procedures, standards, and con-
trols to ensure that they remain 
relevant and effective. 
Do risk assessment results include 
updates to security policies, pro-
cedures, standards, and controls to 
ensure they remain relevant and 
effective? 
Yes     
Governance and 
Risk Manage-
ment 
Policy Reviews 
GRM-09 GRM-09.1 The organization's business leader-
ship (or other accountable business 
role or function) shall review the 
information security policy at 
planned intervals or as a result of 
changes to the organization to en-
sure its continuing alignment with 
the security strategy, effective-
ness, accuracy, relevance, and ap-
plicability to legal, statutory, or 
        
GRM-09.2 Do you perform, at minimum, an-
nual reviews to your privacy and 
security policies? 
Yes     
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regulatory compliance obligations. 
Governance and 
Risk Manage-
ment 
Assessments 
GRM-10 GRM-10.1 Aligned with the enterprise-wide 
framework, formal risk assessments 
shall be performed at least annual-
ly or at planned intervals, (and in 
conjunction with any changes to 
information systems) to determine 
the likelihood and impact of all 
identified risks using qualitative 
and quantitative methods. The 
likelihood and impact associated 
with inherent and residual risk 
shall be determined independently, 
considering all risk categories 
(e.g., audit results, threat and vul-
nerability analysis, and regulatory 
compliance). 
Are formal risk assessments aligned 
with the enterprise-wide frame-
work and performed at least annu-
ally, or at planned intervals, de-
termining the likelihood and im-
pact of all identified risks, using 
qualitative and quantitative meth-
ods? 
Yes     
GRM-10.2 Is the likelihood and impact associ-
ated with inherent and residual 
risk determined independently, 
considering all risk categories 
(e.g., audit results, threat and 
vulnerability analysis, and regula-
tory compliance)? 
  No   
Governance and 
Risk Manage-
ment 
GRM-11 GRM-11.1 Risks shall be mitigated to an ac-
ceptable level. Acceptance levels 
based on risk criteria shall be es-
Do you have a documented, organ-
ization-wide program in place to 
manage risk? 
  No   
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Program GRM-11.2 tablished and documented in ac-
cordance with reasonable resolu-
tion time frames and stakeholder 
approval. 
Do you make available documenta-
tion of your organization-wide risk 
management program? 
  No   
Security Inci-
dent Manage-
ment, E-
Discovery, & 
Cloud Forensics 
Incident Man-
agement 
SEF-02 SEF-02.1 Policies and procedures shall be 
established, and supporting busi-
ness processes and technical 
measures implemented, to triage 
security-related events and ensure 
timely and thorough incident man-
agement, as per established IT ser-
vice management policies and pro-
cedures. 
Do you have a documented securi-
ty incident response plan? 
Yes     
SEF-02.3 Do you publish a roles and respon-
sibilities document specifying what 
you vs. your tenants are responsi-
ble for during security incidents? 
Yes     
SEF-02.4 Have you tested your security inci-
dent response plans in the last 
year? 
  No   
Security Inci-
dent Manage-
ment, E-
Discovery, & 
Cloud Forensics 
Incident Report-
ing 
SEF-03 SEF-03.1 Workforce personnel and external 
business relationships shall be in-
formed of their responsibility and, 
if required, shall consent and/or 
contractually agree to report all 
information security events in a 
timely manner. Information securi-
ty events shall be reported through 
predefined communications chan-
nels in a timely manner adhering to 
applicable legal, statutory, or 
Does your security information and 
event management (SIEM) system 
merge data sources (e.g., app logs, 
firewall logs, IDS logs, physical ac-
cess logs, etc.) for granular analy-
sis and alerting? 
Yes     
SEF-03.2 Does your logging and monitoring 
framework allow isolation of an 
incident to specific tenants? 
Yes     
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regulatory compliance obligations. 
Security Inci-
dent Manage-
ment, E-
Discovery, & 
Cloud Forensics 
Incident Re-
sponse Legal 
Preparation 
SEF-04 SEF-04.1 Proper forensic procedures, includ-
ing chain of custody, are required 
for the presentation of evidence to 
support potential legal action sub-
ject to the relevant jurisdiction 
after an information security inci-
dent. Upon notification, customers 
and/or other external business 
partners impacted by a security 
breach shall be given the oppor-
tunity to participate as is legally 
permissible in the forensic investi-
gation. 
Does your incident response plan 
comply with industry standards for 
legally admissible chain-of-custody 
management processes and con-
trols? 
    N/A 
SEF-04.2 Does your incident response capa-
bility include the use of legally 
admissible forensic data collection 
and analysis techniques? 
    N/A 
Threat and Vul-
nerability Man-
agement 
Antivirus / Mali-
cious Software 
TVM-01 TVM-01.1 Policies and procedures shall be 
established, and supporting busi-
ness processes and technical 
measures implemented, to prevent 
the execution of malware on or-
ganizationally-owned or managed 
user end-point devices (i.e., issued 
Do you have anti-malware pro-
grams that support or connect to 
your cloud service offerings in-
stalled on all of your systems? 
Yes     
TVM-01.2 Do you ensure that security threat 
detection systems using signatures, 
lists, or behavioral patterns are 
  No   
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workstations, laptops, and mobile 
devices) and IT infrastructure net-
work and systems components. 
updated across all infrastructure 
components within industry ac-
cepted time frames? 
Threat and Vul-
nerability Man-
agement 
Vulnerability / 
Patch Manage-
ment 
TVM-02 TVM-02.1 Policies and procedures shall be 
established, and supporting pro-
cesses and technical measures im-
plemented, for timely detection of 
vulnerabilities within organization-
ally-owned or managed applica-
tions, infrastructure network and 
system components (e.g., network 
vulnerability assessment, penetra-
tion testing) to ensure the efficien-
cy of implemented security con-
trols. A risk-based model for priori-
tizing remediation of identified 
vulnerabilities shall be used. 
Changes shall be managed through 
a change management process for 
all vendor-supplied patches, con-
figuration changes, or changes to 
the organization's internally devel-
oped software. Upon request, the 
Do you conduct network-layer vul-
nerability scans regularly as pre-
scribed by industry best practices? 
  No   
TVM-02.2 Do you conduct application-layer 
vulnerability scans regularly as 
prescribed by industry best prac-
tices? 
  No   
TVM-02.3 Do you conduct local operating 
system-layer vulnerability scans 
regularly as prescribed by industry 
best practices? 
Yes     
TVM-02.5 Do you have a capability to rapidly 
patch vulnerabilities across all of 
your computing devices, applica-
tions, and systems? 
  No   
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provider informs customer (tenant) 
of policies and procedures and 
identified weaknesses especially if 
customer (tenant) data is used as 
part the service and/or customer 
(tenant) has some shared responsi-
bility over implementation of con-
trol. 
Threat and Vul-
nerability Man-
agement 
Mobile Code 
TVM-03 TVM-03.1 Policies and procedures shall be 
established, and supporting busi-
ness processes and technical 
measures implemented, to prevent 
the execution of unauthorized mo-
bile code, defined as software 
transferred between systems over 
a trusted or untrusted network and 
executed on a local system without 
explicit installation or execution by 
the recipient, on organizationally-
owned or managed user end-point 
devices (e.g., issued workstations, 
laptops, and mobile devices) and IT 
infrastructure network and systems 
components. 
Is mobile code authorized before 
its installation and use, and the 
code configuration checked, to 
ensure that the authorized mobile 
code operates according to a clear-
ly defined security policy? 
Yes     
TVM-03.2 Is all unauthorized mobile code 
prevented from executing? 
Yes     
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Appendix 2: CSA controls 
 
Threat Domain Control IDs 
Data Breaches Domain 5: Information Management and Data 
Security 
Domain 10: Application Security 
Domain 11: Encryption and Key Management 
Domain 12: Identity, Entitlement and Access 
Management 
Domain 13: Virtualization 
 
AIS-04: Application & Interface Security – Data Security/Integrity 
CCC-02: Change Control & Configuration Management – Outsourced 
Development 
DSI-02: Data Security & Information Lifecycle Management – Data 
Inventory/Flows 
DSI-05: Data Security & Information Lifecycle Management – Infor-
mation Leakage 
DSI-06: Data Security & Information Lifecycle Management – Non-
Production Data 
DSI-08: Data Security & Information Lifecycle Management – Secure 
Disposal 
EKM-02: Encryption & Key Management – Key Generation 
EKM-03: Encryption & Key Management – Sensitive Data Protection 
EKM-04: Encryption & Key Management – Storage and Access 
GRM-02: Governance and Risk Management – Data Focus Risk Assess-
ments 
GRM-10: Governance and Risk Management – Risk Assessments 
HRS-02: Human Resources – Background Screening 
HRS-06: Human Resources – Mobile Device Management 
IAM-02: Identity & Access Management – Credential Lifecy-
cle/Provision Management 
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IAM-04: Identity & Access Management – Policies and Procedures 
IAM-05: Identity & Access Management – Segregation of Duties 
IAM-07: Identity & Access Management – Third Party Access 
IAM-09: Identity & Access Management – User Access Authorization 
IAM-12: Identity & Access Management – User ID Credentials 
IVS-08: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security – Production/Non-
Production Environments 
IVS-09: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security – Segmentation 
IVS-11: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security – Hypervisor Harden-
ing 
SEF-03: Security Incident Management, E-Discovery & Cloud Foren-
sics – Incident Reporting 
STA-06: Supply Chain Management, Transparency and Accountability 
– Third Party Assessment 
 
Weak Identity, Credential and 
Access Management 
Domain 11: Encryption and Key Management 
Domain 12: Identity, Entitlement, and Access 
Management 
 
IAM-01: Identity & Access Management – Audit Tools Access 
IAM-02: Identity & Access Management – Credential Lifecycle / Provi-
sion Management 
IAM-03: Identity & Access Management – Diagnostic / Configuration 
Ports Access 
IAM-04: Identity & Access Management – Policies and Procedures 
IAM-05: Identity & Access Management – Segregation of Duties 
IAM-06: Identity & Access Management – Source Code Access Re-
striction 
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IAM-07: Identity & Access Management – Third Party Access 
IAM-08:Identity & Access Management – Trusted Sources 
IAM-09: Identity & Access Management – User Access Authorization 
IAM-10: Identity & Access Management – User Access Reviews 
IAM-11: Identity & Access Management – User Access Revocation 
IAM-12: Identity & Access Management – User ID Credentials 
IAM-13: Identity & Access Management – Utility Programs Access 
HRS-01: Human Resources – Asset Returns 
HRS-03: Human Resources – Employment Agreements 
HRS-04: Human Resources – Employment Termination 
HRS-08: Human Resources – Technology Acceptable Use 
HRS-09: Human Resources – Training / Awareness 
HRS-10: Human Resources – User Responsibility 
 
Insecure Interfaces and APIs Domain 5: Information Management and Data 
Security  
Domain 6: Interoperability and Portability  
Domain 9: Incident Response  
Domain 10: Application Security  
Domain 11: Encryption and Key Management 
Domain 12: Identity, Entitlement and Access 
Management 
AIS-01: Application & Interface Security – Application Security 
AIS-04: Application & Interface Security – Data Security/Integrity 
IAM-08: Identity & Access Management – Trusted Sources 
IAM-09: Identity & Access Management – User Access Authorization 
 
System and Application Vulner-
abilities 
Domain 1: Cloud Computing Architectural 
Framework 
AIS-01:Application & Interface Security – Application Security 
AIS-02: Application & Interface Security – Customer Access Require-
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Domain 2: Governance and Enterprise Risk 
Management 
Domain 7: Traditional Security, Business Con-
tinuity and Disaster Recovery 
Domain 8: Data Center Operations 
Domain 10: Application Security 
Domain 13: Virtualization 
 
ment 
AIS-03: Application & Interface Security – Data Integrity 
AIS-04: Application & Interface Security – Data Security/Integrity 
BCR-04: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience - 
Documentation 
CCC-03: Change Control & Configuration Management - Quality Test-
ing 
IVS-05: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security Management – Vul-
nerability Management 
IVS-07: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security Management – OS 
Hardening and Base Controls 
TVM-02: Threat and Vulnerability Management – Patch Management 
 
Account Hijacking Domain 2: Governance and Enterprise Risk 
Management  
Domain 5: Information Management and Data 
Security  
Domain 7: Traditional Security, Business Con-
tinuity and Disaster Recovery 
Domain 9: Incident Response 
Domain 11: Encryption and Key Management  
Domain 12: Identity, Entitlement, and Access 
Management 
 
IAM-02: Identity & Access Management – Credential Lifecy-
cle/Provision Management 
IAM-08: Identity & Access Management – Trusted Sources 
IAM-09: Identity & Access Management – User Access Authorization 
IAM-10: Identity & Access Management – User Access Reviews 
IAM-11: Identity & Access Management – User Access Revocation 
IAM-12: Identity & Access Management – User ID Credentials 
IVS-01: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security – Audit Log-
ging/Intrusion Detection 
SEF-02: Security Incident Management, E-Discovery & Cloud Foren-
sics – Incident Management 
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Malicious Insiders Domain 2: Governance and Enterprise Risk 
Management  
Domain 5: Information Management and Data 
Security  
Domain 11: Encryption and Key Management  
Domain 12: Identity, Entitlement, and Access 
Management 
 
DCS-04: Datacenter Security – Off-Site Authorization 
DCS-08: Datacenter Security – Unauthorized Persons Entry 
DCS-09: Datacenter Security – User Access 
DSI-04: Data Security & Information Lifecycle Management – Han-
dling/Labeling/Security Policy 
DSI-06: Data Security & Information Lifecycle Management – Owner-
ship/Stewardship 
EKM-02: Encryption & Key Management – Key Generation 
EKM-03: Encryption & Key Management – Sensitive Data Protection 
GRM-07: Governance and Risk Management – Policy Enforcement 
GRM-10: Governance and Risk Management – Risk Assessments  
HRS-02: Human Resources – Background Screening 
HRS-07: Human Resources – Roles/Responsibilities 
IAM-05: Identity & Access Management – Segregation of Duties 
IAM-01: Identity & Access Management – Audit Tools Access 
IAM-08: Identity & Access Management – Trusted Sources 
IAM-09: Identity & Access Management – User Access Authorization 
IAM-10: Identity & Access Management – User Access Reviews 
IVS-09: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security – Segmentation  
STA-09: Supply Chain Management, Transparency and Accountability 
– Third Party Audits 
 
Advanced Persistent Threats Domain 1: Cloud Computing Architectural AIS-01: Application & Interface Security – Application Security 
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(APTs) Framework 
Domain 2: Governance and Enterprise Risk 
Management 
Doman 7: Traditional Security, Business Con-
tinuity, and Disaster Recovery  
Domain 8: Data Center Operations 
Domain 10: Application Security 
Domain 13: Virtualization 
 
AIS-02: Application & Interface Security – Customer Access Require-
ment 
AIS-03: Application & Interface Security – Data Integrity 
AIS-04: Application & Interface Security – Data Security/Integrity 
BCR-04: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Documentation 
IVS-01: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security – Audit Log-
ging/Intrusion Detection 
IVS-02: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security – Change Detection 
IVS-05: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security Management – Vul-
nerability Management 
IVS-07: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security Management – OS 
Hardening and Base Controls 
IVS-13: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security Management – Net-
work Architecture 
TVM-01: Threat and Vulnerability Management – Anti-Virus/Malicious 
Software 
TVM-02: Threat and Vulnerability Management – Vulnerability/Patch 
Management 
 
Data Loss Domain 5: Information Management and Data 
Security 
Domain 10: Application Security 
Domain 12: Identity, Entitlement and Access 
BCR-04: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Retention Policy 
BCR-05: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Environmental Risks 
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Management 
Domain 13: Virtualization 
 
BCR-06: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Equipment Location 
GRM-02: Governance and Risk Management – Data Focus Risk Assess-
ments 
Insufficient Due Diligence Domain 1: Cloud Computing Architectural 
Framework 
Domain 2: Governance and Enterprise Risk 
Management 
Domain 3: Legal Issues: Contracts and Elec-
tronic Discovery 
Domain 4: Compliance and Audit Manage-
ment 
Domain 5: Information Management and Data 
Security 
Domain 6: Interoperability and Portability 
Domain 7: Traditional Security, Business Con-
tinuity, and Disaster Recovery 
Domain 8: Data Center Operations 
Domain 9: Incident Response 
Domain 10: Application Security 
Domain 11: Encryption and Key Management 
Domain 12: Identity, Entitlement, and Access 
Management 
Domain 13: Virtualization 
AIS-01: Application & Interface Security – Application Security 
AIS-04: Application & Interface Security – Data Security / Integrity 
AAC-01: Audit Assurance & Compliance – Audit Planning 
AAC-02: Audit Assurance & Compliance – Independent Audits 
AAC-03: Audit Assurance & Compliance – Info. System Regulatory 
Mapping 
BCR-01: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Business Continuity Planning 
BCR-02: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Business Continuity Testing 
BCR-03: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Datacenter Utilities / Environ. Conditions 
BCR-04: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Documentation 
BCR-05: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Environmental Risks 
BCR-06: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Equipment Location 
BCR-07: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Equipment Maintenance 
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Domain 14: Security as a Service 
 
BCR-08: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Equipment Power Failures 
BSR-09: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Impact Analysis 
BCR-10: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Policy 
BCR-11: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience – 
Retention Policy 
GRM-01: Governance & Risk Management – Baseline Requirements 
GRM-02: Governance & Risk Management – Data Focus Risk Assess-
ments 
GRM-03: Governance & Risk Management – Management Oversight 
GRM-04: Governance & Risk Management – Management Program 
GRM-05: Governance & Risk Management – Management Sup-
port/Involvement 
GRM-06: Governance & Risk Management – Policy 
GRM-07: Governance & Risk Management – Policy Enforcement 
GRM-08: Governance & Risk Management – Policy Impact on Risk As-
sessments 
GRM-09: Governance & Risk Management – Policy Reviews 
GRM-10: Governance & Risk Management – Risk Management Assess-
ments 
GRM-11: Governance & Risk Management – Risk Management Frame-
work 
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IVS-06: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security – Network Security 
IVS-09: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security – Segmentation 
 
Abuse and Nefarious Use of 
Cloud Services 
Domain 3: Legal Issues: Contracts and Elec-
tronic Discovery 
Domain 7: Traditional Security, Business Con-
tinuity and Disaster Recovery 
Domain 9: Incident Response 
 
HRS-01: Human Resources - Asset Returns 
HRS-02: Human Resources - Background Screening 
HRS-03: Human Resources - Employment Agreements 
HRS-04: Human Resources - Employment Termination 
HRS-07: Human Resources - Roles / Responsibilities 
HRS-08: Human Resources - Technology Acceptable Use 
HRS-10: Human Resources - User Responsibility 
SEF-01: Security Incident Management, E-Discovery & Cloud Foren-
sics - Contact / Authority Maintenance 
SEF-02: Security Incident Management, E-Discovery & Cloud Foren-
sics - Incident Management 
SEF-03: Security Incident Management, E-Discovery & Cloud Foren-
sics - Incident Reporting 
SEF-04: Security Incident Management, E-Discovery & Cloud Foren-
sics - Legal Preparation 
 
Denial of Service Domain 8: Data Center Operations 
Domain 9: Incident Response 
Domain 10: Application Security 
Domain 13: Virtualization 
Domain 14: Security as a Service 
AIS-01: Application & Interface Security - Application Security 
BCR-08: Business Continuity Management & Operational Resilience - 
Equipment Power Failures 
GRM-01: Governance and Risk Management  - Baseline Requirements 
IVS-04: Infrastructure Virtualization Security - Information System 
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 Documentation 
 
Shared Technology Issues Domain 1: Cloud Computing Architectural 
Framework  
Domain 5: Information Management and Data 
Security  
Domain 11: Encryption and Key Management 
Domain 12: Identity, Entitlement, and Access 
Management 
Domain 13: Virtualization 
 
DSI-04: Data Security & Information Lifecycle Management ‒ Han-
dling/Labeling/Security Policy  
EKM-03: Encryption & Key Management - Sensitive Data Protection 
GRM-01: Governance and Risk Management - Baseline Requirements 
IAM-02: Identity & Access Management - Credential Lifecy-
cle/Provision Management 
IAM-05: Identity & Access Management - Segregation of Duties 
IAM-12: Identity & Access Management - User ID Credentials  
IVS-01: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security - Audit Log-
ging/Intrusion Detection 
IVS-09: Infrastructure & Virtualization Security - Segmentation 
TVM-02: Threat and Vulnerability Management - Vulnerability/Patch 
Management 
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Appendix 3: Recommendations 
 
Domain 2 - Governance and enterprise risk management 
Recommendations 
 
 Identify the shared responsibilities of security and risk management based on the chosen cloud deployment and service model. Develop a Cloud 
Governance Framework/Model as per relevant industry best practices, global standards, and regulations like CSA CCM, COBIT 5, NIST RMF, 
ISO/IEC 27017, HIPAA, PCI DSS, EU GDPR, etc. 
 Understand how a contract aﬀects your governance framework/model. 
o Obtain and review contracts (and any referenced documents) before entering into an agreement. 
o Don’t assume that you can eﬀectively negotiate contracts with a cloud provider—but this also shouldn’t necessarily stop you from using that 
provider. 
o If a contract can’t be eﬀectively negotiated and you perceive an unacceptable risk, consider alternate mechanisms to manage that risk 
(e.g. monitoring or encryption). 
 Develop a process for cloud provider assessments. 
o This should include: 
o Contract review. 
o Self-reported compliance review. 
o Documentation and policies. 
o Available audits and assessments. 
o Service reviews adapting to the customer’s requirements. 
o Strong change-management policies to monitor changes in the organization’s use of the cloud services. 
o Cloud provider re-assessments should occur on a scheduled basis and be automated if possible. 
 Cloud providers should oﬀer easy access to documentation and reports needed by cloud prospects for assessments. 
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o For example, the CSA STAR registry. 
 Align risk requirements to the specific assets involved and the risk tolerance for those assets. 
 Create a specific risk management and risk acceptance/mitigation methodology to assess the risks of every solution in the space 
 Use controls to manage residual risks. 
o If residual risks remain, choose to accept or avoid the risks. 
 Use tooling to track approved providers based on asset type (e.g. linked to data classification), cloud usage, and management. 
 
Domain 3 - Legal issues, contracts and electronic delivery 
Recommendations 
 
 Cloud customers should understand the relevant legal and regulatory frameworks, as well as contractual requirements and restrictions that ap-
ply to the handling of their data or data in their custody, and the conduct of their operations, before moving systems and data to the cloud. 
 Cloud providers should clearly and conspicuously disclose their policies, requirements and capabilities, including all terms and conditions that 
apply to the services they provide. 
 Cloud customers should conduct a comprehensive evaluation of a proposed cloud service provider before signing a contract, and should regular-
ly update this evaluation and monitor the scope, nature and consistency of the services they purchase. 
 Cloud providers should publish their policies, requirements and capabilities to meet legal obligations for customers, such as electronic discov-
ery. 
 Cloud customers should understand the legal implications of using particular cloud providers and match those to their legal requirements. 
 Cloud customers should understand the legal implications of where the cloud provider physically operates and stores information. 
 Cloud customer should decide whether to choose where their data will be hosted, if the option is available, to comply with their own jurisdic-
tional requirements. 
 Cloud customers and providers should have a clear understanding of the legal and technical requirements to meet any electronic discovery re-
quests. 
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 Cloud customers should understand that click-through legal agreements to use a cloud service do not negate requirements for a provider to per-
form due diligence. 
 
Domain 4 - Compliance and audit management 
Recommendations 
 
 Compliance, audit, and assurance should be continuous. They should not be seen as merely point-in-time activities, and many standards and 
regulations are moving more towards this model. 
 Cloud providers should: 
o Clearly communicate their audit results, certifications, and attestations with particular attention to: 
o The scope of assessments. 
o Which specific features/services are covered in which locations and jurisdictions. 
o How customers can deploy compliant applications and services in the cloud. 
o Any additional customer responsibilities and limitations 
o Cloud providers must maintain their certifications/attestations over time and proactively communicate any changes in status. 
o Cloud providers should engage in continuous compliance initiatives to avoid creating any gaps, and thus exposures, for their customers. 
o Provide customers commonly needed evidence and artifacts of compliance, such as logs of administrative activity the customer cannot oth-
erwise collect on their own. 
 Cloud customers should: 
o Understand their full compliance obligations before deploying, migrating to, or developing in the cloud. 
o Evaluate a provider’s third-party attestations and certifications and align those to compliance needs. 
o Understand the scope of assessments and certifications, including both the controls and the features/services covered. 
o Attempt to select auditors with experience in cloud computing, especially if pass-through audits and certifications will be used to manage 
the customer’s audit scope. 
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o Ensure they understand what artifacts of compliance the provider oﬀers, and eﬀectively collect and manage those artifacts. 
o Create and collect their own artifacts when the provider’s artifacts are not sufficient. 
o Keep a register of cloud providers used, relevant compliance requirements, and current status. The Cloud Security Alliance Cloud Controls 
Matrix can support this activity. 
 
Domain 5 - Information and governance 
Recommendations 
 
 Determine your governance requirements for information before planning a transition to cloud. This includes legal and regulatory requirements, 
contractual obligations and other corporate policies. Your corporate policies and standards may need to be updated to allow a third party to 
handle data. 
 Ensure information governance policies and practices extend to the cloud. This will be done through contractual and security controls. 
 When needed, use the data security lifecycle to help model data handling and controls. 
 Instead of lifting and shifting existing information architectures take the opportunity of the migration to the cloud to re-think and re-structure 
what is often the fractured approach used in existing infrastructure. 
 
Domain 9 - Incident response 
Recommendations 
 
 SLAs and setting expectations around what the customer does versus what the provider does are the most important aspects of incident re-
sponse for cloud-based resources. Clear communication of roles/responsibilities and practicing the response and hand-oﬀs are critical. 
 Cloud customers must set up proper communication paths with the provider that can be utilized in the event of an incident. Existing open 
standards can facilitate incident communication. 
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 Cloud customers must understand the content and format of data that the cloud provider will supply for analysis purposes and evaluate wheth-
er the available forensics data satisfies legal chain of custody requirements. 
 Cloud customers should also embrace continuous and serverless monitoring of cloud-based resources to detect potential issues earlier than in 
traditional data centers 
o Data sources should be stored or copied into locations that maintain availability during incidents. 
o If needed and possible, they should also be handled to maintain a proper chain of custody. 
 Cloud-based applications should leverage automation and orchestration to streamline and accelerate the response, including containment and 
recovery. 
 For each cloud service provider used, the approach to detecting and handling incidents involving the resources hosted at that provider must be 
planned and described in the enterprise incident response plan. 
 The SLA with each cloud service provider must guarantee support for the incident handling required for the eﬀective execution of the enter-
prise incident response plan. This must cover each stage of the incident handling process: detection, analysis, containment, eradication, and 
recovery. 
 Testing will be conducted at least annually or whenever there are significant changes to the application architecture. Customers should seek to 
integrate their testing procedures with that of their provider (and other partners) to the greatest extent possible. 
 
Domain 11 - Data security and encryption 
Recommendations 
 
 Understand the specific capabilities of the cloud platform you are using. 
 Don’t dismiss cloud provider data security. In many cases it is more secure than building your own, and comes at a lower cost. 
 Create an entitlement matrix for determining access controls. Enforcement will vary based on cloud provider capabilities. 
 Consider CASB to monitor data ﬂowing into SaaS. It may still be helpful for some PaaS and IaaS, but rely more on existing policies and data re-
pository security for those types of large migrations. 
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 Use the appropriate encryption option based on the threat model for your data, business, and technical requirements. 
 Consider use of provider-managed encryption and storage options. Where possible, use a customer-managed key. 
 Leverage architecture to improve data security. Don’t rely completely on access controls and encryption. 
 Ensure both API and data-level monitoring are in place, and that logs meet compliance and lifecycle policy requirements 
 Standards exist to help establish good security and the proper use of encryption and key management techniques and processes. Specifically, 
NIST SP-800-57 and ANSI X9.69 and X9.73. 
 
